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Why do people often choose to cooperate when they
can better serve their interests by acting selfishly?
One potential mechanism is that the anticipation of
guilt can motivate cooperative behavior. We utilize
a formal model of this process in conjunction with
fMRI to identify brain regions that mediate coopera-
tive behavior while participants decided whether or
not to honor a partner’s trust.We observed increased
activation in the insula, supplementary motor area,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and temporal
parietal junction when participants were behaving
consistent with our model, and found increased
activity in the ventromedial PFC, dorsomedial PFC,
and nucleus accumbens when they chose to abuse
trust and maximize their financial reward. This study
demonstrates that a neural system previously impli-
cated in expectation processing plays a critical role
in assessingmoral sentiments that in turn can sustain
human cooperation in the face of temptation.
INTRODUCTION
Daily life confronts us on a regular basis with social situations in
which we sometimes place trust in those around us or alternately
are entrusted by others. Often, this takes the form of informal
agreements, with the promise of benefits to all concerned if
mutual trust is upheld. As an example, imagine we are in a coffee
shop, and another customer asks us to watch over her laptop as
she steps outside to make a phone call. Assuming we repay this
trust and do indeed protect her laptop, it is clear what the benefit
to her is. But what is in it for us? These everyday informal situa-
tions are amainstay of our social life, but there is surprisingly little
experimental research examining the question of whatmotivates
this behavior. Indeed, although we may painstakingly deliberate
the merits of entering a formal legal contract, we rarely give
much thought to the psychological foundations of these more560 Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.mundane arrangements. However, these decisions serve as the
foundation for a safe (Sampson et al., 1997) and economically
successful society (Smith, 1984; Zak and Knack, 2001), and
thus increased knowledge of the neural structures that underlie
these behaviors can provide valuable clues into the mechanisms
that underlie these behaviors of trust and reciprocity.
Understanding the dynamic processes of strategic interac-
tions has traditionally been under the purview of the field of
economics. Classical models of human behavior have typically
assumed that people maximize their own material self-interest;
however, a host of experimental evidence demonstrates that
people appear to care about the payoffs of others (Camerer,
2003). This insight has consequently resulted in the development
of a number of models that emphasize other-regarding prefer-
ences. These models typically consider either the distribution
of payoffs (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) or other player’s intentions (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin, 1993) and posit that
cooperation occurs largely as the result of a positive, prosocial
motivation (Fehr and Camerer, 2007).
An alternative mechanism underlying trust and reciprocity that
has received considerably less empirical attention concerns the
influence of affective state on interactive decision making,
specifically the role of anticipated guilt in deciding to help others.
Guilt can be conceptualized as a negative emotional state asso-
ciated with the violation of a personal moral rule or a social stan-
dard (Haidt, 2003) and is particularly salient when one believes
they have inflicted harm, loss, or distress on a relationship
partner, for example when one fails to live up to the expectations
of others (Baumeister et al., 1994). Acting to minimize guilt can
thus be a powerful motivator in the decision-making process.
According to this proposal, we may be particularly vigilant of
our neighbor’s laptop, not because of any prosocial feeling,
but rather because we anticipate feeling terrible if anything
happened when the owner expected us to care for it. Supporting
this idea, some research has demonstrated that people are
indeed guilt averse and in fact often do make decisions to mini-
mize their anticipated guilt regarding a social interaction. While
these studies have provided evidence that beliefs about others’
expectations motivate cooperative behavior (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Reuben
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Neural Basis of Guilt Aversionet al., 2009; but see also Ellingsen et al., 2010) and that specifi-
cally thinking about a guilty experience can promote greater
levels of cooperation (Ketelaar and Au, 2003), no study to date
has directly demonstrated that guilt avoidance is the mechanism
that underlies these decisions to cooperate. However, sophisti-
cated methods from neuroscience such as fMRI can provide
important insights into the underlying mechanisms.
It is important to note that there is at present very limited under-
standingof howcomplex social emotions suchasguilt are instan-
tiated in the brain. The few previous studies investigating the
neural underpinningsof thismechanismhaveemployedmethods
whichmay not realistically evoke natural feelings of guilt, such as
script-driven imagery (e.g., ‘‘remember a time when you felt
guilt’’) (Shin et al., 2000) or imaginary vignettes (e.g., ‘‘I shoplifted
a dress from the store’’) (Takahashi et al., 2004). Because we
contend that that the anticipation of guilt can motivate prosocial
behavior, it is critical to explore how guilt impacts decision
making while participants are actually undergoing a real social
interaction. According to our conceptualization of guilt, people
balance how they would feel if they disappointed their relation-
ship partner against what they have to gain by abusing their trust.
It is possible that during this process people may even experi-
ence a preview of their future guilt at the time of the decision,
which may be what ultimately motivates them to cooperate.
Therefore, the present study attempts to address these ques-
tions by integrating theory andmethods from the diverse fields of
psychology, economics, and neuroscience to understand the
neuralmechanisms thatmediate cooperativebehavior.Weutilize
a formalmodel of guilt aversion (Battigalli andDufwenberg, 2007)
developed within the context of Psychological Game Theory
(PGT; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009; Geanakoplos et al.,
1989), which provides a mathematical framework to allow indi-
vidual utility functions to encompass beliefs—a feature essential
for modeling emotions. Importantly, using a formal model
provides a precise quantification of the amount of guilt antici-
pated in eachdecision, andcanbeused topredict brain networks
that track this signal. The use of computational models has been
instrumental in understanding the neural systems underlying
complex cognitive constructs involved in decision making such
as prediction error (O’Doherty et al., 2004), uncertainty (Preusch-
off et al., 2006), andmentalizing (Hampton andO’Doherty, 2007).
This approach provides a principled method for both illuminating
the neural responses to feelings of guilt and also exploring how
they directly guide social decision making.
For example, consider how behavior might be modeled in the
commonly-studied Trust Game (TG) (Berg et al., 1995) using
a guilt-aversion model. In this game, a player (the Investor)
must decide howmuch of an endowment to invest with a partner
(the Trustee – see Figure 1A). Once transferred, this money is
multiplied by some factor (often 3 or 4), and then the Trustee
has the opportunity to return money back to the Investor. If the
Trustee honors trust, and returns money, both players end up
with a highermonetary payoff than originally endowed. However,
if the Trustee abuses trust and keeps the entire amount, the
Investor takes a loss. The standard economic solution to this
game uses backward induction and predicts that a rational and
selfish Trustee will never honor the trust given by the Investor,
and the Investor realizing this, should never place trust in the firstplace, and will invest zero in the transaction. In contrast, our
model of guilt aversion posits that a rational Trustee is interested
in bothmaximizing their financial payoff (M2) andminimizing their
anticipated guilt associated with letting their partner down.
Anticipated guilt can be operationalized as the nonnegative
difference between the amount of money the Investor expects
back (E1S2) and the amount that the Trustee actually returns
(S2). Because the Trustee typically does not know the Investor’s
true belief, their expectation of this belief, referred to as their
second order belief (E2E1S2), can be used as a proxy.
U2 =M2 Q12ðE2E1S2  S2Þ+ (1)
According to this model, the Trustee’s anticipated guilt is thus
based on their second order beliefs. The weight placed on antic-
ipated guilt in the utility function ismodulated by a guilt sensitivity
parameter (Q12), which can vary for each partner the Trustee
encounters. Participants make decisions, which maximize this
utility function. If they are sufficiently guilt averse (Q12 > 1),
then they will maximize their utility by returning the amount that
they expect their partner will return, otherwise (Q12 < 1) they
will receive the most utility from keeping all of the money (see
Figure S1 available online for a simulation).
While a number of studies have investigated the neural
systems underlying Investor’s initial decisions to trust (Delgado
et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007), there
have been surprisingly few that have studied the Trustee’s corre-
sponding decisions to cooperate (Baumgartner et al., 2009;
van den Bos et al., 2009). Previous work has found evidence
that decisions to cooperate in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game are associated with the ventral striatum (Rilling et al.,
2002). However, it is important to note that decisions to
cooperate in sequential games (i.e., the TG) may be fundamen-
tally different from those in simultaneous-move games (i.e.,
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game) because of the ability to visibly
choose before the other player in the former (McCabe et al.,
2000, 2003). Neuroscientific investigations of the TG have shown
that decisions to abuse trust are associated with activity in the
vmPFC and PCC (van den Bos et al., 2009). This study also
observed interesting individual differences indicating that when
making selfish decisions, trust abusers exhibit more activity in
the ventral striatum and less activity in the insula, as compared
to cooperators. These results suggest that decisions to betray
trust by trust abusers may be motivated by reward-related
regions such as the ventral striatum and vmPFC, while decisions
to cooperate may be associated with the insula for cooperators.
Another study of Trustee behavior has focused on honoring
promises to reciprocate rather than cooperation per se (Baum-
gartner et al., 2009). Here, the authors found that dishonest
participants had greater amygdala activation as compared to
honest participants when deciding whether or not to reciprocate
their partner’s trust. While both of these studies examining
Trustee behavior have provided important insights into their
respective questions of interest, neither has provided evidence
directly addressing the specific mechanism that underlies the
decision to cooperate in these interactive scenarios.
The aim of the present study is to use a theory-driven
approach to examine the neural processes associated withNeuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 561
Figure 1. Trial Timeline
(A) Schematic of Trust Game (TG) with beliefs.
Player 1 decides how much of their endowment
they want to invest in Player 2 (S1) and has an
expectation about the amount of money that
Player 2 will return (E1S2). The amount that Player 1
invests is multiplied by a factor of 4 by the exper-
imenter. Player 2 has a belief about Player 1’s
expectation (E2E1S2) and decides how much
money to return back Player 1 (S2).
(B) At session 1, all participantsmet as a group and
played in the role of the Investor. After making an
investment to every player, they were also asked
how much of this amount (multiplied by 4) they
believed their partner would return to them.
(C) Session 2 took place while the participants
underwent functional magnetic resonance
imaging and played in the role of Trustee. Partici-
pants first saw a fixation cross (A) and then
a picture of their partner (B) on that round.
Participants’ beliefs about their partner’s offer
were then recorded (C) and then the actual offer
was revealed (D). Next, participants’ beliefs about
the amount of money they believed their partner
expected them to reciprocate were recorded (E)
and they then decided how much they actually
wanted to return (F). The final outcome was dis-
played (G) and then the partner’s actual expecta-
tions were revealed (H).
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Neural Basis of Guilt Aversionguilt-motivated cooperation while the decision maker is
immersed in a real, consequential interaction. As modeled by
Equation 1, we elicit the participants’ expectations and utilize
them to isolate the neural systems involved in the anticipation
of guilt. We predicted that the motivation to minimize anticipated
guilt would induce participants to cooperate and that these
cooperative decisions would therefore be associated with
greater activity in the insula/acc and amygdala, based on
previous studies of both guilt (Shin et al., 2000) and general
negative affect (Calder et al., 2000; Damasio et al., 2000).
Thirty participants were recruited to play multiple single-shot
rounds of a TG split over two sessions. Importantly, during this
study we employed no deception, and therefore all participant
interactions were both real and financially consequential. Use
of this methodology allows us to examine actual interactions
and also account for naturally occurring individual differences
in both trust and reciprocity. During Session 1, all participants
played as Investor and made an offer to every other participant
in the experiment. In addition, we asked each participant to
report the amount of money that they expected their partner
to return (E1S2). Seventeen of these participants were recruited
to play as the Trustee in a subsequent imaging session. During
Session 2, each of these participants played 28 single-shot
rounds of the TG as the Trustee while undergoing functional562 Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
During the TG they received the actual
offers made by each Investor during
Session 1 (see Figure 1 for a trial timeline
of both sessions). After learning about the
amount of money player 1 sent, we firstelicited the Trustee’s second-order beliefs about the amount of
money that they believed the Investor expected them to return
(E2E1S2). Participants could then return any amount of their
multiplied investment in 10% increments (S2). At the conclusion
of Session 2, all participants were shown a recap of each round,
and their subjective counterfactual guilt was assessed (see
methods).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Our behavioral results demonstrated that participants behaved
in a similar fashion to previous TG experiments (Camerer,
2003; Figure 2). The Investor usually sent some amount of their
endowment to the Trustee, with the Trustee being quite accurate
in predicting this investment (mixed effects regression, two-
tailed; b = 0.15, se = 0.06, t = 2.29, p = 0.02). The Trustee was
also generally accurate in predicting the Investors’ expectations
(b = 0.85, se = 0.06, t = 15.20, p < 0.001; Figure 3A). Supporting
our model of guilt aversion, the Trustee used these expectations
to guide their decision-making behavior, as they typically re-
turned close to the amount of money that they believed their
partner expected them to return (b = 0.90, se = 0.04, t = 21.32,
p < 0.001; Figure 3B). Finally, participants reported that they
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Histogram of the Investor’s Investment for all trials for all participants (mean = 51.7%, sd = 20.7%).
(B) Histogram of the percentage of their investment (multiplied by 4) that they expect the Trustee to return (1st Order Belief) (mean = 40.81%, sd = 10.44%).
(C) Histogram of the percentage of the Investor’s investment (multiplied by 4) that the Trustee believes the Investor expects them to return (2nd Order Belief)
(mean = 44.33%, sd = 3.52%).
(D) The percentage of the Investor’s investment (multiplied by 4) that the Trustee decides to return (mean = 38.37%, sd = 7.80%).
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Neural Basis of Guilt Aversionwould have felt more counterfactual guilt had they chosen to
return less money than they actually did (b = 0.14, se = 0.03,
t = 4.14, p < 0.001; Figure 3C). Taken together, these results
suggest that participants behaved in a manner consistent with
our model of guilt aversion.
Neuroimaging Results
We conducted several different analyses to examine the neural
mechanisms underlying guilt aversion. First, a main contrast
identified the neural processes underlying decisions that were
consistent with the predictions of the guilt-aversion model (i.e.,
match expectations or not). Second, we explored processesthat tracked parametrically with the predictions of the model.
Third, we examined whether these processes could be ex-
plained by individual differences in guilt sensitivity estimated
from their subjective counterfactual guilt ratings. Finally, we
investigated the functional relationships between regions within
the previously identified networks.
Main Contrast
To characterize the neural processes underlying the behavioral
results, we attempted to isolate the two sources of value in Equa-
tion 1—the minimization of anticipated guilt and the maximiza-
tion of financial reward. To do this, we compared trials during
the decision phase in which participants returned the exactNeuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 563
Figure 3. Behavioral Results
(A) Investor’s first-order belief (E1S2) by the Trustee’s second-order belief (E2E1S2).
(B) The amount returned by the Trustee (S2) by their second-order belief (see Table S1 for additional analyses).
(C) Participant’s self-reported counterfactual guilt (the amount of guilt they would have felt had they returned less money) by the difference from their hypothetical
choice from their actual behavior. The dotted lines represent participant’s best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs).
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Neural Basis of Guilt Aversionamount they believed their partner expected (i.e., minimized their
anticipated guilt) to trials in which they returned less than they
believed their partner expected (i.e., enhanced their financial
reward). The duration of the decision phase was modeled as
the time to decision. There was no significant difference in the
response time between trials in which participants matched
expectations (mean = 3412.29 ms, sd = 1310.65) as compared
to trials in which they returned less than their expectation
(mean = 3666.87 ms, sd = 1475.47; b = 0.25, se = 0.14,
t = 1.80, p = 0.08). It is important to note that this response
time is not particularly meaningful as participants were required
to scroll through their choices and the starting point was random
(see Experimental Procedures). The contrast, illustrated in Fig-
ure 4, revealed increased activity in the insula, supplementary564 Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.motor area (SMA), dorsal anterior cingulate (DACC), dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and parietal areas, including the
temporal parietal junction (TPJ), when participantsmatched their
second-order beliefs about their partner’s expectations, thus
minimizing guilt. Returning less than their second-order belief,
and thereby increasing financial gain, was associated with
greater activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex VMPFC,
bilateral nucleus accumbens (NAcc), and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (DMFPC) (See Table S2 for all identified regions).
Parametric Contrast
While the main contrast illustrates regions associated with mini-
mizing expected guilt as compared to maximizing financial
payoff, an additional question of interest is whether these activa-
tions change parametrically as a function of the actual deviation
Figure 4. Minimizing Guilt Compared to Maximizing Financial Reward
(A) Increased activity (yellow) in the SMA, ACC, and cerebellum when matching expectations. Increased activity (blue) in the NAcc, VMPFC, and DMPFC
can be seenwhen participants returned less than their second-order belief. The colormap indicates Z values between 0 and 4. Error bars on the peristimulus plots
reflect ± 1 standard error.
(B) Increased activity (yellow) in the insula when matching expectations and increased activity (blue) in the bilateral NAcc when returning less than their
expectations.
(C) Increased activity in the insula, SMA, and right DLPFC (yellow) when matching expectations and increased activity (blue) in the left NAcc when returning less
than expectations. The left blowup depicts the relationship between participant’s counterfactual guilt sensitivity and their average activity for the insula. The right
blowup depicts participant’s estimated counterfactual guilt sensitivity and their average activity in the bilateral NAcc. See Figure S1 for a blowup of the SMA.
Images are presented using radiological conventions (right = left) on the participant’s average high resolution T1 image. The images are whole-brain thresholded
using cluster correction Z > 2.3, p < 0.05.
See also Figure S2 and Table S2.
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Neural Basis of Guilt Aversionfrommatching expectations. To address this question we tested
a parametric contrast that compared trials in which participants
matched expectations to linear deviations from expectations (in
10% increments). Similar to the main contrast, matching expec-
tations was associated with increased activity in the right insula,
right DLPFC, SMA, ACC, and precuneous (see Figure 5 and
Table S3). Returning incrementally less than expectations wasassociated with increased activity in the bilateral NAcc and
MPFC (including VMPFC, DMPFC, and ACC).
However, participants systematically made slightly less
money in trials in which they matched expectations (mean =
$12.28, sd = 5.88) compared to trials in which they returned
less than they believed the other player expected ($14.58, sd =
6.79; beta = 2.08, t = 2.53, p < 0.05). To address this potentialNeuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 565
Figure 5. Parametric Contrast between Matching
Expectations and Returning Less Than Second-
Order Beliefs
This figure reflects the parametric contrast (+6 1 2 3)
of the regressors, indicating matching expectations,
returning 10% less than expectations, returning 20%
less than expectations, and returning +30% less than
expectations. Images are displayed in radiological orien-
tation (left = right) and are thresholded using whole
brain cluster correction, Z > 2.3, p < 0.05. Color maps
reflect Z values between 0 and 4. See also Figure S3 and
Table S3.
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tracking forgone financial payoffs rather than guilt aversion, we
ran an additional analysis (see Supplemental Information) that
allowed us to examine the effect of matching expectations while
controlling for the amount of money that subjects return (i.e.,
their forgone financial payoff). Consistent with our interpretation,
matching expectations was associated with increased activity in
the insula, ACC, SMA, bilateral DLPFC, and TPJ. Regions asso-
ciated with reward maximization (i.e., returning less than expec-
tations) no longer survived cluster correction after controlling for
forgone financial rewards, presumably as a consequence of high
multicollinearity (see Figure S3 and Table S4).
Individual Differences
These data support the intriguing possibility suggested by our
model that distinct networks may be processing competing
motivations to either increase reward or decrease one’s antici-
pated guilt. To examine this hypothesis further, we employed
an individual differences approach in which we explored the
relationship between differences in self-reported counterfactual
guilt, assessed independently of the game, and our regions of
interest across participants (see Figures 4C and S2; Experi-
mental Procedures). Results from a robust regression (one-
tailed) indicated that increased guilt sensitivity is positively
related to increased activity in the insula and SMA (b = 106.92,
se = 50.44, p = 0.05 and b = 99.64, se = 46.49, p = 0.02, respec-
tively). That is, participants who reported that they would have
felt more guilt had they returned less money showed increased
insula and SMA activity when they matched expectations. In
contrast, we observed a negative relationship between guilt
sensitivity and the NAcc (b = 89.17, se = 44.28, p = 0.03),
indicating that participants who reported that they would have
experienced no change in guilt had they returned less money
demonstrated increased activity in the NAcc when making
a decision to maximize their financial reward. This effect is
anatomically specific to these regions, as there were no signifi-
cant relationships observed between guilt sensitivity and the
right DLPFC, left DLPFC, VMPFC, or DMPFC.
Interregional Correlations
While we have primarily focused on disentangling the neural
systems associated with the motivations underlying decision
behavior, we also observed a network of regions that have previ-566 Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.ously been associated with an executive control system (e.g.,
DLPFC, parietal regions, and SMA) (Miller and Cohen, 2001)
when participants matched expectations. Consistent with work
that has suggested that the insula and SMA may comprise
a distinct network which signals the need for executive control
(Sridharan et al., 2008), we observed positive relationships
between the insula and SMA across subjects (r(16) = 0.64,
p < 0.01) and also between bilateral DLPFC and the SMA
(r(16) = 0.74, p < 0.001), but no relationship between the insula
and DLPFC (Pearson correlations, two-tailed). These relation-
ships are concordant with previous conceptualizations of PFC
functioning (Miller and Cohen, 2001) and suggest that the insula
may recruit the dlPFC for increased self-control via the SMA.
Finally, we also observed a significant negative relationship
between activity in the insula and the NAcc across subjects
(r(16) = 0.56, p = 0.02), hinting at a possible reciprocal relation-
ship between these two systems, a relationship also predicted
by our model.
DISCUSSION
Utilizing a formal game theoretic model of utility maximization
involving guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), we
find compelling evidence that moral sentiments aid in producing
cooperative behavior in a consequential social exchange. Our
model formalizes the psychological construct of guilt as a devia-
tion from a perceived expectation of behavior and in turn posits
that trust and cooperation may depend on avoidance of
a predicted negative affective state. Congruent with our model’s
predictions, we observed evidence suggesting that when partic-
ipants chose whether or not to honor an investment partner’s
trust distinct neural systems are involved in the assessment of
anticipated guilt and in maximizing individual financial gain,
respectively. These results provide converging psychological,
economic, and neural evidence that a guilt-aversion mechanism
underlies decisions to cooperate and demonstrate the utility of
an interdisciplinary approach in assessing the motivations
behind high-level decision-making.
Our experimental paradigm adds to the standard TG method-
ology by also eliciting participants’ (second-order) beliefs, allow-
ing us to test the predictions of the guilt-aversion model.
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interactions were financially consequential, which importantly
allows us to examine real interactions and also account for natu-
rally occurring individual differences in both trust and reciprocity.
Consistent with previous work (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000), our results indicate that
participants do indeed engage in mentalizing and are in fact
able to accurately assess their partners’ expectations. Further,
as proposed by the model, participants use these expectations
in their decisions and frequently choose to return the amount
of money that they believe their partner expected them to return.
Based on the postexperimental ratings that assess counterfac-
tual guilt, we can infer that the motivation to match expectations
is guilt aversion. Indeed, participants report that they would have
felt more guilt had they returned less money in the game.
The guilt-aversion model explored here is distinct to other
models of social preference as it posits that participants can
mentalize about their partner’s expectations and that they then
use this information to avoid disappointing the partner. In
contrast, other models conjecture that people are (1) motivated
by a ‘‘warm glow’’ feeling and find cooperation inherently
rewarding (Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Camerer, 2007), (2) moti-
vated to minimize the discrepancy between self and others’
payoffs (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999),
or (3) motivated to reciprocate good intentions and punish bad
intentions (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993).
The guilt-aversion model thus provides a different psychological
account of cooperation than other models because it incorpo-
rates both social reasoning and social emotional processing.
The model also makes the interesting prediction that a social
emotion is in effect an expectation error signal (Montague and
Lohrenz, 2007), which functions to motivate people to behave
consistent with shared social expectations. There is preliminary
evidence indicating that these different motivations may be
mediated by distinct neural systems. For example, altruism
may be associated with areas associated with reward process-
ing in the ventral striatum (Rilling et al., 2002). Inequity aversion
may be associated with OFC (Tricomi et al., 2010), and inten-
tion-based reciprocity may be associated with a theory of mind
network including the TPJ and the MPFC (van den Bos et al.,
2009).
To understand the neural mechanisms underlying our model,
we attempted to dissociate the competing motivations to either
minimize guilt or maximize financial gain by comparing trials
in which participants chose tomatch their partners’ expectations
to trials in which they returned less than they believed their
partner expected. Participants exhibited increased activity in
the insula, SMA, DACC, DLPFC, and parietal areas, including
the TPJ, when they minimized their anticipated guilt by
returning the amount of money that they believed their partner
expected them to return. These results are consistent with
another study which examined Trustee’s decisions to cooperate
(van den Bos et al., 2009), indicating that the belief elicitation
procedure did not appear to alter the neural processing of coop-
erative decisions. The insula, SMA, and ACC have been impli-
cated in a number of negative affective states such as guilt
(Shin et al., 2000), anger (Damasio et al., 2000), and disgust
(Calder et al., 2000) as well as physical pain, social distress(Eisenberger et al., 2003), and empathy for other’s pain (Singer
et al., 2004; see Craig, 2009, for a review). These studies support
our conjecture that the prospect of not fulfilling the expectations
of another can result in a negative affective state, which in turn
ultimately motivates cooperative behavior. Finally, it is inter-
esting to note that the neural systems involved in making deci-
sions that minimize anticipated guilt are remarkably similar to
those previously demonstrated to be involved in the decision
to reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al.,
2003), suggesting that at least one function of this network
may be to motivate adherence to shared social expectations
(Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). Recent work on decisions to
conform to a perceived social norm has uncovered the same
network (Berns et al., 2010; Klucharev et al., 2009), which indi-
cates that perhaps the function of this frequently observed
network is to track deviations from expectations and bias actions
to maintain adherence to the expectation such as a moral rule or
social norm. Sanfey et al., (2003) find that this network biases
behavior to punish norm violators, while we observe here that
this network biases behavior to be congruent with a socially
shared expectation. This interpretation is consistent with
a wealth of work on expectations in other domains of cognitive
neuroscience such as novelty detection (Downar et al., 2000),
placebo effects (Wager et al., 2004), and error monitoring
(Miller and Cohen, 2001), suggesting that the network may be
domain general (Dosenbach et al., 2006) and extend to social
decision making.
An alternative interpretation of our results is that Trustees feel
empathy toward the Investor and anticipate their partner’s an-
ticipated disappointment, which motivates them to cooperate.
Empathy (like guilt) is another nebulous construct, though has
yet to be formalized. Both empathy and guilt aversion require
the ability to represent another’s mental state (i.e., theory of
mind) and directly relate to other’s disappointment. However,
one crucial distinction between the two constructs is that
empathy posits that the Trustee feels the Investor’s anticipated
emotion (e.g., disappointment), while guilt-aversion contends
that the act of disappointing a partner produces an emotion in
the Trustee (e.g., guilt), which is qualitatively different from
what the Investor is experiencing. Though our current design
cannot parse apart these two interpretations, nor can our
imaging results, as both of these constructs likely involve the
insula (Singer et al., 2004), future work might attempt to differen-
tiate between these two closely related constructs from both
theoretical and empirical perspectives.
When participants returned less than their second-order belief
and thereby increased their own financial gain, we found activa-
tion associated with greater activity in the VMPFC, bilateral
NAcc, and DMFPC. These results became even more pro-
nounced when we examined parametric deviations from expec-
tation. Consistent with previous work that has examined
decisions to abuse trust (van den Bos et al., 2009), we find
increased activity in the VMPFC when participants return less
than they believe their partner expected and predict that damage
to this region would likely impair the ability to form accurate
expectations, producing the guilt insensitive pattern of behavior
observed in patient work (Krajbich et al., 2009). More broadly,
however, these regions (i.e., NAcc and VMPFC) have receivedNeuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 567
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and the anticipation and processing of both primary and
secondary reward (Dreher and Tremblay, 2009). In addition, we
observed activity in the DMPFC, which has been implicated in
mentalizing (Amodio and Frith, 2006) or simulating another’s
mental state. This signal may indicate that participants are
engaging in reasoning about their partner’s potential reaction
to their decision. Together, these results suggest that maxi-
mizing one’s utility involves a process of weighing the costs
and benefits of letting a relationship partner down.
It is possible that the network associated with matching
expectations is tracking forgone financial payoffs rather than
guilt aversion per se. However, this interpretation is unlikely
because we continue to observe activity in the insula when
participants match expectations after controlling for the amount
of money that participants chose to return. To provide further
support for our interpretation that the competing motivations to
maximize financial gain and minimize anticipated guilt are
associated with distinct regions, we examined the relationship
between the regions of interest (as defined by the group
analyses) and independently assessed individual differences in
guilt sensitivity. Consistent with our interpretation, we find that
participants who report that they would have experienced
more guilt had they returned less money demonstrated
increased insula and SMA activation when they matched expec-
tations. Conversely, participants who claimed that they would
not have experienced any additional guilt had they returned
less money showed increased activity in the NAcc when they
in fact returned less than they believed their partner expected
them to return. This implies that there is individual variability in
the way in which anticipated guilt influences decisions. People
who are more guilt sensitive have increased activity in the
network associated with moral sentiments, while people with
less guilt sensitivity have greater activity in those areas associ-
ated with reward and value.
Together, our results suggest that participants who are guilt
sensitive may experience moral sentiments via the insula and
SMA, which signals that they will feel guilty if they believe they
let their investment partner down. This notion that feelings can
be used as information in the decision-making process has
been discussed in other domains of decision making such as
risk (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Mellers et al.,
1997; Slovic et al., 2002) and regret (Coricelli et al., 2005).
According to this framework, people generate anticipated
emotions about how they might feel after choosing a particular
outcome, which ultimately predicts their decision (Mellers
et al., 1997). Interestingly, anticipatory feelings associated with
risk have been reliably associated with the anterior insula (Critch-
ley et al., 2001) and ACC (Coricelli et al., 2005), which provides
further support for our argument that guilt aversion is generated
by a sampling of the sentiment in question and is processed by
the cingulo-insular network. Importantly, this extends the notion
of anticipatory emotions from individual decision making to
social contexts. These feelings originating in the insula may
recruit the DLPFC to override the competing motivation to maxi-
mize financial gain and overall result in participants honoring
their partner’s trust and returning their initial investment. If this
neural account is accurate, thenwewould predict that disrupting568 Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.the DLPFC, insula, or ACC/SMA would result in participants
choosing to return less money in the TG, as has indeed recently
been demonstrated (Knoch et al., 2009). However, we make the
divergent predictions that while disrupting all regions would
reduce cooperative behavior, disrupting the DLPFC would still
result in an affective response, while disrupting the insula or
ACC/SMA would in contrast blunt the experience of guilt. Our
results also predict that inaccurate expectations should also
influence cooperative behavior. Overestimating partners’ expec-
tations would result in excessive guilt and enhanced associated
insula/ACC/SMA activation, while underestimating partners’
expectations would temper participant’s guilt and insula/ACC/
SMA activation and ultimately reduce their levels of cooperation,
which is consistent with findings with patients with VMPFC
damage (Krajbich et al., 2009).
This study demonstrates the synergistic effects of applying
a neuroeconomic approach to the study of higher-level socio-
cognitive-affective processes. Imprecise psychological con-
structs such as guilt can be formally operationalized using
sophisticated economic models. In turn, the integration of
psychological constructs into economic models can substan-
tially improve their ability to predict actual decision-making
behavior, in comparison to classical approaches. Finally, and
most importantly, this interdisciplinary approach allows these
mathematically quantified psychological constructs to be exam-
ined at the neural level in order to both better specify the theoret-
ical models, as well as further understand the interactions
between neural systems.
To return to our original example, our results suggest that one
reason why we choose to stand guard over a stranger’s posses-
sions for no obvious reward is because signals originating in the
insula and SMA remind us that allowing something bad to
happen to the laptop, and thus deviating from the owner’s
expectations, would lead to strong feelings of guilt in the event
of an untimely theft. Ultimately, gaining a greater mechanistic
understanding of the microprocesses that can occur at a neural
level can help facilitate greater understanding of emergent prop-
erties of macro-level interactive behavior that play a vital role in
creating and maintaining a harmonious society.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Thirty participants (mean age = 18.5, female = 30%) were recruited from the
University of Arizona campus, all of whom were screened for any significant
health or neurological problems. The experiment was approved by the local
Institutional Review Board and consisted of two separate sessions. From
this sample, all participants that were eligible to enter the MRI environment
(n = 17) were recruited from Session 1 to participate in Session 2 (mean
age = 18.5, female = 53%). One participant from session 1 was excluded as
a result of erratic responses, and some of one participant’s fMRI data from
the second session was lost due to technical reasons. Participants were
assumed to be strangers.
Experimental Design
At session 1, all participants met as a group, were assigned an identification
number, and had their individual pictures taken. After the instructions to the
game were explained, all pictures were presented one at a time to the entire
group. While the pictures were being presented, each participant played in
the role of the Investor with the pictured participant and was endowed with
Neuron
Neural Basis of Guilt Aversion$10 for the round. After making an investment on the round, they were then
asked how much of this amount (multiplied by 4) they believed their partner
would return to them. At the end of the session, participants were paid $5
for their participation.
A subset of participants (n = 17) were recruited from Session 1 to participate
in the second session, in which they played the TG in the role of the Trustee
while being scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Each participant had an individually tailored paradigm, in which they decided
how much money they wanted to return to the other participants in the exper-
iment, based on these partners’ actual proposals to them fromSession 1. Each
participant played a total of 28 rounds, distributed over four runs. Each run
lasted exactly 7 min including an extra 14 s fixation cross display at the begin-
ning of the run to allow for T1 equilibrium, and another 21 s fixation cross at the
end of the run (210 volumes per run). The timeline of events in a typical round
can be seen in Figure 1B. The stimuli were presented using E-Prime software
via VisuaStim goggles (Resonance Technologies Inc, IL, USA), and partici-
pants indicated their answers by using a two-button fiber optic response
box. Responses changed in 10% increments on each button press. These
increments were randomly selected to either increase from $0 or decrease
from the maximum amount of money for that round (which varied depending
on how much had been sent by the partner), ensuring that the number of
button presses was orthogonal to the amount of money selected, removing
effects of any motor confounds. After participants selected their chosen
amount of money, they used the second button to confirm this response.
After participants completed scanning, they rated their counterfactual guilt
by indicating on a 7-point Likert scale the amount of guilt they believed they
would have experienced had they returned a different amount of money,
and were then paid a $20 participation fee. Finally, at the conclusion of the
entire experiment, all participants were paid 50% of their earnings for one
randomly selected trial. If participants participated in both sessions, they
were paid for two separate trials. Participants in the first session that correctly
predicted their partner’s behavior for the trial selected received an additional
$2 bonus (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Dufwenberg and Gneezy,
2000). Only identification numbers were provided at the time of payment,
thus ensuring that Trustees’ responses were completely anonymous. No
deception was employed in this study.
Data Acquisition
Each scanning session included a T1-weighted MPRAGE structural scan
(TR = 11 ms, TE = 4 ms, matrix = 256 3 256, slice thickness = 1 mm, gap =
0 mm) and four functional runs. Functional scans were acquired in the axial
plane using a 3-shot multiple echo planar imaging (MEPI) GRAPPA sequence
which aided in reducing geometric distortions (Newbould et al., 2007). Param-
eters were optimized to maximize signal in regions associated with high
susceptibility artifact (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe)
(Sto¨cker et al., 2006; Weiskopf et al., 2006) (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 256 ms,
matrix = 96 3 96, FOV = 192 mm, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, 42 axial slices).
Data Preprocessing
Functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using the FSL
Software package 4.1.4 (FMRIB, Oxford, UK). The first three volumes of
each functional run were discarded to account for T1 equilibrium effects.
Images were corrected for slice scan time using an ascending interleaved
procedure. Head motion was corrected using MCFLIRT using a six parameter
rigid-body transformation. Images were spatially smoothed using a 5 mm
full-width at half maximum Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter was used to
cut off temporal periods longer than 66 s. All images were initially coregistered
to the participant’s high-resolution structural scan and were then coregistered
to the MNI 152 person 2 mm template using a 12 parameter affine transforma-
tion. All functional analyses are overlaid on the participants’ average high-
resolution structural scan in MNI space.
General Analysis Methods
A three-level mixed-effects general linear model (GLM) was used to analyze
the imaging data. A first-level GLM was defined for each participant’s func-
tional run that included a boxcar regressor for each epoch of interest (e.g.,
decision phase) convolved with a canonical double-gamma hemodynamicresponse function (HRF). The duration of epochs in which participants
submitted a response were modeled using the participant’s reaction time
(Grinband et al., 2008). To account for residual variance, we also included
the temporal derivatives of each regressor of interest, the six estimated
headmovement parameters, and anymissed trials as covariates of no interest.
The resulting general linear model was corrected for temporal autocorrelations
using a first-order autoregressive model. A second-level fixed effects model
was fit for each subject to account for intrarun variability. For each participant,
contrasts were calculated between parameter estimates for different regres-
sors of interest at every voxel in the brain. A third-level mixed-effects model
using FEAT with full Bayesian inference (Woolrich et al., 2004) was used to
summarize group effects for every specified contrast. Statistical maps were
corrected formultiple comparisons usingwhole-brain cluster correction based
on Gaussian random field theory with an initial cluster threshold of Z > 2.3 and
a Family Wise Error corrected threshold of p < 0.05 (Worsley et al., 1992).
Peristimulus plots used functionally defined ROIs and were calculated by
fitting a FIR model using fslroi 2.0 (Poldrack, 2007) and averaging within and
then across participants.
Behavioral Analyses
All behavioral statistics were computed using the R statistical package
(R Development Core Team, 2008). For regressions that included repeated
observations, we used the lme4 mixed effects GLM package (Bates et al.,
2008). Participants were treated as a random effect with varying intercepts
and slopes. We report the regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), t
values, and p values. Because there is no generally agreed upon method for
calculating p values in mixed models, we used two separate methods. First,
we calculated the degrees of freedom by subtracting the number of fixed
effects from the total number of observations (Kliegl et al., 2007). Second,
we generated confidence intervals from the posterior distribution of the
parameter estimates using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (Baayen
et al., 2008). These methods produced identical results. For robust regres-
sions, we used the rlm function from the MASS package using MM estimation
(Venables and Ripley, 2002).
Guilt Sensitivity Estimation
Our linear model of guilt aversion (Equation 1) makes sharp predictions about
the amount of money that participants should return (see Figure S1 for
a simulation). Our model allows for the guilt sensitivity parameter (q12) to
vary for every Investor/Trustee interaction. There are two possible maxima
of the utility function depending on q12. If participants are completely guilt
averse (q12 > 1) then the model predicts they should always match their
second-order belief. If they are completely guilt in-averse (q12 < 1) then they
should always keep all of the money. Because all participants demonstrated
some degree of guilt sensitivity, meaning that no subject always kept all of
the money, all participants were classified as guilt averse and thus we
observed no variability in Q12.
Counterfactual Guilt
To confirm that participants were actually motivated by anticipated guilt, we
elicited their counterfactual guilt for each trial following the scanning session.
After displaying a recap of each trial, we asked participants how much
guilt they would have felt had they returned a different amount of money.
This amount was randomly selected from all choices below and one choice
above the amount they actually returned (choices increased or decreased in
10% increments). The deviation from the participant’s actual choice was
used to predict the amount of guilt that participants reported that would
have felt had they returned that amount using a mixed effects regression.
Thus, each participant’s best linear unbiased predictions (BLUPs) (Pinheiro
and Bates, 2000) represent their sensitivity to guilt. Larger slopes indicate
that participants reported they would have felt more guilt had they returned
less money, revealing a higher degree of guilt sensitivity, while smaller slopes
reveal a low degree of guilt sensitivity with participants, indicating little
change in the amount of guilt they would have experienced had they returned
less money. The regression can be seen in Figure 2C along with each partici-
pant’s BLUP.Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 569
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To identify regions of the brain that are associatedwith anticipated guilt as pre-
dicted by our model, we examined trials during the return phase in which
participants matched expectations by returning the amount of money that
they believed their partner expected (n = 207), as compared to trials in which
they returned less than they believed their partner expected (n = 183). This
allowed us to identify neural systems associated with guilt aversion and also
to see systems involved in maximizing financial payoffs. For this analysis, we
excluded trials by modeling them as covariates of no interest where (1) the
partner sent $0, and thus there was no decision for the participant to make
(n = 33), (2) the participant returned more than their second order belief
(n = 66), and (3) the participants either did not indicate their belief or the amount
they wanted to return (n = 20). This model thus included the following
30 regressors:
(1) Face phase
(2) Prediction phase
(3) Investment phase
(4) Belief elicitation phase
(5) Decision phase when participants matched their partner’s expecta-
tions (n = 207)
(6) Decision phase when participants returned 10% less than their
partners’ expectations (n = 99)
(7) Decision phase when participants returned 20% less than their
partners’ expectations (n = 46)
(8) Decision phase when participants returned 30%+ less than their
partners’ expectations (n = 38)
(9) Decision phase when participants returned more than their expecta-
tions (n = 66)
(10) Summary phase
(11) Handed-down-belief phase
(12) Missed trials
(13–24) Temporal derivatives of regressors 1–12
(25–30) Estimated head movement parameters (6)
We compared trials in which the participant matched their expectations
to trials in which they returned less than their expectations (+0.99 0.33
0.330.33 for regressors 5–8). The results of this analysis can be seen in Fig-
ure 4 and Table S2.
Analysis 2, Parametric Contrast
An additional question of interest is whether the activations found above
change parametrically as a function of deviation from matching expectations.
To address this, we tested a parametric contrast in which we compared trials
in which participants matched expectations to a linear deviation in 10% incre-
ments Winsorized at 30%. Responses greater than or equal to 30% were
grouped together, as these were relatively rare and this procedure ensured
that the number of cases were balanced across regressors. This contrast
specifically compared matching expectations to returning 10% less, 20%
less, and 30+% less (+6 1 2 3 for regressors 5–8) using the model from
Analysis 1 .
Analysis 3, Counterfactual Guilt Correlations
To address the hypothesis that regions associated with guilt aversion should
becomemore active as a function of guilt sensitivity, we extracted the average
third-level parameter estimates from each of the regions of interest and exam-
ined their relationship with our measure of counterfactual guilt. We extracted
the average values in the clusters located in the right and left DLPFC, insula,
SMA, MOFC, and DMPFC by restricting to voxels that were located both in
these clusters and in the respective anatomical masks taken from the
Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas. Because of the small size of the nucleus
accumbens, all voxels located in a bilateral anatomical mask were used
regardless of statistical significance. We used the individual slopes (BLUPs)
from the random effects component of the counterfactual guilt analysis
as our metric of guilt sensitivity. Due to the noise of the two metrics
(average beta values from a third-level imaging analysis and individual
BLUPs from a mixed effects analysis) and non-Gaussian distribution, we570 Neuron 70, 560–572, May 12, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.used robust regression to estimate the effects using MM estimation (Venables
and Ripley, 2002).
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